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ABSTRACT
Political dynasty in the regional election in Indonesia has 
been canceled by the Constitutional Court (MK). In fact, the 
political dynasty is considered as elements that undermine 
the promotion of democracy and anti-corruption culture in 
Indonesia. Moreover, in case of corruption, political dynasty 
has a very close relationship with corruption, or commonly 
known as political corruption. By law, a political dynasty 
can no longer be resisted. Therefore, what is needed is how 
to prevent or at least to minimize the political corruption 
committed by the incumbent. This paper is set in 3 sub-
headings, namely (a) corruption in Regional Elections: 
(b). Political Corruption by Incumbent; and (c) Political 
Corruption Prevention. Based on the analysis performed, 
the incumbent has broad access in economic, social, and 
politics which can provide a personal benefit to him or 
win his group in the elections. Therefore, the prevention 
of political corruption can be focused on (1) the financial 
preparedness and the control of campaign funds; (2) the 
opening of a space for people to demand commitment, 
consistency of attitude, and integrity of the incumbent in 
the fight against political corruption; and (3) enforcement 
of the rules must be carried out firmly without compromise
INTRODUCTION
Through the Decision of the Constitutional Court 
of the Republic of Indonesia (MK) No. 33 / PUU-XII / 
2014 dated on July 8, 2015 related to the judicial review 
of Law No. 8 of 2015 on the Amendments to Law No. 
1 of 2014 on the Election of Governor, Regent and City 
Mayor (Law No. 8 of 2015), the Constitutional Court 
(MK) is viewed to have legalized political dynasty in the 
216 Asia Pasific Fraud JournalVolume 1, No.2nd Edition (july-December 2016)
Fajar Laksono Soeroso : Political Corruption Prevention In Regional.....
Page 215-226
election of Governor, Regent and City Mayor 
(Regional Rlection). The Constitutional Court 
(MK) declared unconstitutionally related to 
requirements of candidates for regional head 
/ vice regional head that do not have conflict 
of interest with incumbent as stated in Article 
7 of Law No 8 of 2015 letter r.1 In fact, the 
provision was intended to cut off the chains of 
political dynasties, corrupt actions, and abuse 
of authority.2 The provision was also intended 
to make the regional election and political 
contestation run fairly and equally. In order to 
run equally, the provision was set in such a way 
1  In Article 7 letter r UU 8/2015 states: “tidak 
memiliki konflik kepentingan dengan petahana”. 
Penjelasan Pasal 7 huruf r: “Yang dimaksud 
dengan “tidak memiliki konflik kepentingan 
dengan petahana” adalah tidak memiliki 
hubungan darah, ikatan perkawinan dan/atau 
garis keturunan 1 (satu) tingkat lurus ke atas, ke 
bawah, ke samping dengan petahana yaitu ayah, 
ibu, mertua, paman, bibi, kakak, adik, ipar, anak, 
menantu kecuali telah melewati jeda 1 (satu) kali 
masa jabatan”. MK menilai, pembatasan calon 
kepala daerah yang memiliki hubungan dengan 
petahana telah melanggar UUD.‎ Menurut MK, 
tampak nyata perbedaan yang dibuat melalui 
ketentuan tersebut semata-mata untuk membatasi 
kelompok orang tertentu, yakni anggota 
keluarga petahana untuk menggunakan hak 
konstitusionalnya untuk dipilih atau mencalonkan 
diri. MK menilai bahwa idealnya demokrasi 
melibatkan sebanyak mungkin rakyat untuk turut 
serta dalam proses politik. Meski pembatasan 
dibutuhkan untuk menjamin kuota pemegang 
jabatan publik agar sesuai dengan kapasitas 
kapabilats, hal tersebut tak boleh mencegah hak 
konstitusi. MK menyatakan, ketentuan Pasal 7 
huruf r UU 8/2015 t bertentangan dengan Pasal 
28I ayat (2) UUD 1945. MK pun menyadari, 
dilegalkannya seseorang yang memiliki hubungan 
darah/perkawinan dengan petahana akan dapat 
membuat politik dinasti. Namun menurut MK, 
hal tersebut tidak boleh dijadikan alasan, terutama 
karena UUD 1945 mengatur supaya tidak terjadi 
diskriminasi.
2  See Putusan MK Nomor 33/PUU-XIII/2015, p. 
76.
that the incumbent is just allowed to run for the 
regional head in the same region for the next 
one period.3
It means that after the Decision of the 
Constitutional Court, political dynasty would 
still exist, whereas, political dynasty is 
considered as the element that undermines the 
promotion of democracy and anti-corruption 
culture in Indonesia.4 If it is linked with 
corruption, political dynasty is closely related to 
corruption. As generally understood, corruption 
and power are like two sides of the same coin. 
Corruption always accompanies a power trip. 
The power even becomes a catalyst for a person 
to have corrupt behavior. With power, someone 
has the authority, opportunity and influence 
to do anything he wants. Steven Lukes called 
power as the ability to manufacture influence 
3  Ibid.
4  Dinasti politik disebut sebagai bentuk praktik 
politik predator. Pemahaman politik predator 
sendiri merupakan pengembangan tesis mengenai 
local strongmen yang dilakukan Migdal (1988) 
maupun studi Sidel mengenai local bossism 
(2005). Studi pendekatan ini dilakukan oleh Asako 
(2010) dan McCoy (1994) yang menganalisis 
tumbuhnya dinasti politik justru terjadi karena 
adanya kolusi bisnis-politik di tingkat lokal. Dalam 
hal ini, jejaring keluarga telah menguasai berbagai 
proyek pembangunan daerah yang kemudian 
dibagi-bagikan kepada kroni-kroninya. Dinasti 
politik berperan sebagai patron dalam menjaga 
stabilitas kolusi tersebut dengan menempatkan 
sanak familinya ke dalam jajaran perusahaan 
maupun pemerintahan. Oleh karena itu, praktik 
penjarahan ekonomi berlangsung secara terus 
menerus karena praktiknya selalu dilakukan oleh 
jejaring elit keluarga. Lihat Wasisto Rahardjo 
Jati, Revivalisme Kekuatan Familisme dalam 
Demokrasi: Dinasti Politik di Aras Lokal, Jurnal 
Sosiologi MASYARAKAT, Vol. 18, No.2, Juli 
2013, Jakarta: Pusat Kajian Sosiologi, LabSosio-
FISIP UI, p. 206-207.
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and wealth.5 In addition, political corruption 
will also likely be more rampant.
There is no agreement on the conception of 
political corruption. J. Kristiadi says that the 
conception of political corruption should be 
adjusted with the problems and the interests of 
the nation in the face of the threat of political 
corruption.6 Arbi Sanit states that political 
corruption can manifest in the form of party 
corruption, electoral corruption, parliamentary 
corruption, government corruption, political 
justice corruption, and corruption of government 
bureaucracy.7 According to T. Jacob, political 
corruption can be in the form of tyranny of 
treason or subversion, lobbyism, vote-buying, 
electoral fraud, patronage and favoritism.8 
More specifically, Ubaedillah Badrun argues 
that electoral corruption is as part of political 
corruption. Electoral corruption is a new 
term to describe the symptoms of corruption 
in the implementation of election. The term 
political corruption was born from a wide 
range of studies on the violations of campaign 
financing done by participants of the election, 
especially those with the status of incumbent. 
5  Steven Lukes,  ”Kekuasaan”, in William Outhwaite 
(ed), Kamus Lengkap Pemikiran Sosial Modern, 
Second Edition, (Jakarta: Kencana Prenada 
Media, 2008), p.669
6  J.Kristiadi, “Demokrasi dan Korupsi Politik”, 
dalam Wijayanto dan Ridwan Zachrie (Ed),Korupsi 
Mengorupsi Indonesia, Sebab, Akibat, dan Proses 
Pemberantasan, (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka 
Utama, 2009), p. 448-449.
7  Arbi Sanit, Madat Korupsi Politik, Kompas, 21 
Agustus 2012.
8  Bima Arya Sugiarto, “Politik Uang dan Pengaturan 
Dana Politik di Era Reformasi”, in Wijayanto and 
Ridwan Zachrie (Ed), Korupsi Mengorupsi..., 
Op.Cit, p. 479
Furthermore, electoral corruption is part of 
what being committed by politicians before 
getting power.9 
Referring to the opinion, political corruption 
in this article refers to the vulnerable corruption 
committed  by the regional head (incumbent) 
with various advantages possessed that could be 
misused for the benefit of himself (if he wants to 
nominate himself again), his family members, 
his relatives, or certain groups that are close to 
him. Departing from this, the legalization of 
political dynasty by the Constitutional Court 
does not need to be resisted, because what 
should be done right now is to accompany it 
using instruments of prevention or limitation.
This paper is not intended to make 
annotations, especially aimed at examining 
the decision of the Constitutional Court. This 
paper, however, rests on the provision that the 
Decision of the Constitutional Court is final 
and binding, that should be respected and 
implemented. This paper suggests a review of 
political corruption prevention strategies at the 
level of regional government as a consequence 
of the Decision of the Constitutional Court. So, 
although politically the prohibition of political 
dynasties is urgently needed to prevent the 
domination of the political power of the 
particular dynasty in leading a region, but 
legally, the Constitutional Court has ‘canceled’ 
the requirement that the candidates for regional 
head / vice do not have a conflict of interest 
9  Ubaedillah Badrun, Membendung Korupsi Politik, 
Makalah dalam Seminara Mengawal Pemilu 
2014 “Anak Muda Membendung Korupsi Politik 
2013” held by BEMJ Sosiologi Universitas Negeri 
Jakarta on April 7, 2013.
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with incumbent. Therefore, the concern after 
the Decision of the Constitutional Court 
should no longer debate the substance of the 
decision, but rather on how political corruption 
by the incumbent can be prevented or at least 
minimized effectively.
Corruption in Regional Elections
Political corruption is viewed as the mother 
of corruption that becomes a major problem 
and the most prominent in the election. As 
mentioned above, electoral corruption is part of 
political corruption. In the literature, electoral 
corruption is defined as any activity undertaken 
by election participants and other parties 
who provide promising rewards in the form of 
money, goods, services, positions and other 
benefits directly or indirectly to the voters, 
organizers, supervisors, and other institutions 
related to the election aimed at influencing 
choice or election process thus benefiting the 
election participants or certain groups. Such 
definition can be applied not only in general 
elections, but also in the regional elections. This 
is because, historically, the regional elections, 
as stipulated in Law 8 of 2015, used to use the 
term regional head election as included in the 
electoral regime.
In the perspective of democracy, election 
is a measure of democracy. Election is 
the actualization of democratic values. 
Correspondingly, election is the actualization 
of democratic institutions at the local level. The 
term “democracy” refers to the meaning that, 
at the last level it is the people who give the 
provisions of the basic problems concerning 
their lives, including in assessing the state 
policy. Therefore, the state policy determines 
the life of the people.10  Through the regional 
election, the doors of deliberation are open 
wide for the people to determine the direction 
of governance in their region. Through the 
regional election, the policies made by the 
elected regional head are expected to meet the 
aspirations of the constituents. The regional 
elections are expected to produce local leaders 
who are close to people. In addition, the 
regional elections are an integral part of the 
acceleration of democratization at the national 
level. It means that democracy at the national 
level will thrive well if democratic values at the 
local level have been  deeply rooted.11 
However, as the arena of political 
contestation, the regional elections are often 
colored with political means and strategies to 
win the competition, including taking illegal 
ways, committing fraud through the abuse 
of power, or using the power and financial 
influence. It proves to the general understanding 
that corruption, in general, relates to power. In 
the political context, according to Oscar Arias 
Sanchez, one of the founders of Transparency 
International, the most dangerous corruption 
is an affair between the power and special 
interests that sneak in the power structure of 
government.12 Hannah Arendt, in the book 
10  Deliar Noer, Pengantar ke Pemikiran Politik, CV 
Rajawali, Jakarta, 1983, p. 207.
11  T.A. Legowo, Menakar Kualitas Hasil Pilkada: 
Beberapa Pokok Catatan, Makalah Seminar 
Pilkada: Masalah dan Prospek, di Jakarta, 30 
Agustus 2005.  
12 Bima Arya Sugiarto, “Politik Uang...”, Op.Cit, 
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“Human Condition”, also wrote that the various 
types of corruption are almost always related 
to the interaction of power. In the realm of 
the state, the interaction will be getting brutal 
when the authorities still have mentality of 
animal laborans, in which the orientation of 
the necessities of life and the obsession with 
production consumption is still dominant. With 
such mentality, politicians will tend to make 
politics as the main livelihood. As a result, 
corruption is inevitable in the interaction of 
political power.13
Satjipto Rahardjo introduced two types 
of corruption: conventional corruption and 
non-conventional corruption.14 Conventional 
corruption is corruption which refers to the 
Law on Corruption Eradication. There are three 
elements of action to be referred as corruption 
under the Law: (1) benefiting oneself, other 
people, or corporation, (2) inflicting state 
financial loss, and (3) violating or in contrary to 
law. For example, state officials accept bribes 
or manipulate prices in the procurement of 
goods / services. This confirms that corruption 
and procurement of goods / services cannot be 
separated. Where there is the procurement of 
goods / services, there is the corruption.
Meanwhile, non-conventional corruption is 
not literarily called corruption as mentioned in 
the Law. Thus, although an act of state official 
does not break the law and does not inflict the 
state financial loss, in a democratic system of 
governance, the act harms the integrity, violates 
2009, p. 475.
13  Ibid.
14  Satjipto Rahardjo, Membedah Hukum Progresif, 
(Jakarta: Kompas, 2006), p. 135.
the principles of propriety or the sensitivity of 
the people. Satjipto Rahardjo gave the example 
that non-conventional corruption is “the 
corruption of power”, that is the implementation 
of public power anywhere and at any level that 
has evil quality, dishonesty, weak empathy, and 
no quality, and undermine public confidence. 
It is the use of arbitrary power (willekeur), 
sloppy, doing the job / project below standard, 
working carelessly, having no concern for 
the feelings of the people, and so on.15 Such 
corruption is also often referred to as pseudo-
corruption. Both conceptions of corruption are 
very likely to be found in the modes of political 
corruption in regional elections, because 
political corruption is usually committed by 
misusing the facilities or political convenience 
owned by the perpetrator. In fact, the facilities 
and conveniences are the people’s mandate. 
Political Corruption by Incumbent
Given the experience in the previous 
election, with regard to political corruption 
committed by the incumbent, it could be 
traced from some violations committed by the 
incumbent, especially based on the experience 
of the regional election before 2015. In general, 
there are at least seven cases emerging in the 
previous election. The seven cases are (1) 
political money; (2) the use of assets, state 
facility, and government program for the 
campaign; (3) the misuse of funds for political 
purposes; (4) the engagement / mobilization 
of civil servants, village heads to support a 
candidate; (5) the election organizer is not 
neutral; (6) the violation of the requirements of 
15  Ibid, p. 136.
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the candidates; and (7) the loss of voting rights.16 
In this regard, the Chairman of Elections 
Monitoring Board (Bawaslu), Muhammad, 
says that the incumbent has potential violations 
in mobilizing the bureaucracy, through the 
mobilization of civil servants, as well as 
promotion. In addition, the use of state property 
or the use of the regional budget is a possible 
potential used by the unscrupulous incumbent.17
In line with this statement, Moh. Mahfud 
MD recorded seven points, in which two of them 
are related to the incumbent. First, the regional 
election raises the issue of the budget. The most 
prominent issue is that the election uses a very 
high budget. Article 112 of Law No. 32 of 2004 
in force at that time stated that the election 
fees are charged to the budget. This provision 
resulted in regional finances were much sucked 
to finance the implementation of the regional 
election. Thus, the budget allocation for the 
development, which has direct contact with the 
public, is reduced. In addition, the determination 
of the election budget often holds the election 
organizers. In the region where the incumbent 
nominate himself again, the determination 
and disbursement of budget are often used as 
a tool to pressure or as bargaining tool with 
the organizers of the election to smooth his 
candidacy or scuttle his political opponents. 
Second, the election triggers the politicization 
16  Potensi Pelanggaran Pilkada Masih 
Tin g g i , h t t p : / /w w w. p ik i r an - r ak y a t . co m/
politik/2015/04/05/322411/potensi-pelanggaran-
pilkada-masih-tinggi. Downloaded on Juli 17, 
2015.
17  Bawaslu Antisipasi Pelanggaran Hukum Saat 
Pilkada ,http:/ /www.mahkamahkonsti tusi .
go.id/index.php?page=web.Berita&id=11410#.
VbrYR7VfuSo. Downloaded on Juli 20, 2015.
of the bureaucracy. In many regions, incumbent 
of regional head candidate almost always 
involves mass mobilization of civil servants, 
whether they are regular employees, the sub-
district heads, village heads, and others to win 
him over. Whereas, in democratic country, 
the bureaucrats should be exempt from the 
influence and political ties with the political 
forces so that the services provided by the 
bureaucracy to the public are neutral, impartial, 
and objective. Biased bureaucracy may spawn 
political corruption that even changes the 
process of regional election which is marred by 
improper acts.
Political corruption in regional elections 
not only affects the quality of the elections, but 
also influences the post-election political policy 
direction. Furthermore, political corruption in 
the regional elections makes the prospects of 
the consolidation of local democracy gloomy, 
resulting in the democratic consolidation delays 
nationwide. In the meantime, the question arises: 
although no democratic country is entirely free 
of corruption, why can corruption survive and 
grow in the democratic system simultaneously?18 
In fact, democracy in Indonesia fails to become 
a system and mechanism to effectively combat 
corruption. The theories, explaining that 
democracy is a system or proper political way 
to eradicate corruption, are in fact inapplicable 
in Indonesia. Indonesia has failed to make 
democracy as a system and legal political tool 
to combat corruption.19 Political corruption is 
18  Teten Masduki, Korupsi dan Demokrasi, Kompas, 
24 Mei 2011.
19  Moh. Mahfud MD, Demokrasi Jalan Korupsi, 
Koran Sindo, March 14, 2014.
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getting worse because there is corruptio optimi 
pessima, in which corruption becomes very 
serious because it is committed by high-level 
officials.
Political Corruption Prevention
There are at least three factors that can be 
put forward as to why incumbent most likely to 
win the election?
First, the incumbent is in control of 
economic access. Position as a regent or mayor 
or governor makes the incumbent have a greater 
chance of controlling the economic access than 
other candidates. The ease of economic access 
enables the incumbent to get funds, especially 
to finance his candidacy. The incumbent 
even often gets an offer of election funds 
from various parties. With abundant funds, 
the incumbent can do many things. Even in a 
democratic political contestation, though it is 
not the only factor, funding will determine the 
prospects for political victory. Political funding 
is the main resource in capturing, maintaining, 
or increasing the power.20
Second, the incumbent is in control of 
social access. The control of social access 
allows the incumbent to have higher popularity 
and electability than other candidates. As the 
regional head, the incumbent has a broad access 
and opportunity to meet people. By using the 
office facilities, the incumbent is able to attend 
or create events to be ‘close’ to the citizens. 
In recent years, the policy of social grants in 
various areas could not be separated from the 
20  Bima Arya Sugiarto, “Politik Uang..., 2009, Loc.
Cit, p. 492.
will of the incumbent to foster and strengthen 
social capital before competing in the elections.
Third, the incumbent is in control of 
political access. As a regional head, the 
incumbent of course has certain ease of access 
to the political elites, especially the leaders 
of political parties at the regional levels. The 
political parties often scramble to put the 
incumbent as the chairperson of the political 
parties at the regional level. Similarly, in the 
nomination before the regional election, the 
incumbent does not need to seek the supporting 
political parties because it is even the political 
parties that come to offer themselves as the 
supporters. Ease of political access will surely 
enable the incumbent to freely choose the 
political machine that he considers having 
significant and broad support in the region.
Based on the control of these accesses by 
the incumbent, the preventive measures against 
political corruption committed by the incumbent 
in the regional elections should be designed 
to close or at least to narrow the political 
corruption space in the three realms above. In 
this case, restrictions on the incumbent, who is 
in fact attached to the advantages that allow the 
abuse of authority, must be carried out within 
the limits. This is in line with the consideration 
of the Decision No. 33 / PUU-XIII / 2015, in 
which the Constitutional Court stated that ... 
however, such restrictions should be addressed 
to the incumbent of regional head and not to 
his family, relative, or particular groups. Since 
the benefits are attached to the incumbent of 
regional head, the possibility of the misuse is 
also attached to the incumbent of the regional 
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head. The family of the incumbent of the 
regional head or specific groups might  just be 
benefited by such a situation if there is a role 
or involvement of the incumbent of regional 
head, regardless the issue of whether the role 
or involvement of the incumbent of regional 
head is done directly and openly or indirectly 
and covertly. Based on such possibilities, the 
restrictions on incumbent of regional head 
should be formulated in the Act.
To narrow the political corruption 
committed by the incumbent in the regional 
elections and to prevent any political corruption 
in the regional elections, it is necessary to note 
the following:  
First, in relation to the control of access to 
the economy by the incumbent, if the political 
fund is seen as the epicenter of political 
corruption, the regulatory regime of political 
corruption should be emphasized on efforts to 
control the flow of funds in political campaigns. 
Related to the campaign funds in the regional 
elections, Bima Arya Sugiarto mentioned two 
important factors: (1) the source of funding, 
and (2) the financial statements. In practice, 
the main sources of candidates’ campaigns 
come from the candidate himself. Therefore, 
financial preparation is a necessary condition 
for the set to be a candidate. In addition to the 
obligation to submit the Wealth Report, the 
candidate can also be requested the financial 
profile stating factual financial readiness. 
Meanwhile, the financial statements related to 
campaign funds tend not describe the actual 
flow of funds.21 In other words, the campaign 
fund reports are still just a subterfuge. There 
are 6 (six) approaches used in controlling the 
flow of political campaign funds, namely:22
a. Limitation of campaign fund donation. 
b. This limitation is intended to reduce the 
influence of donor to the candidate after the 
elections.
c. Prohibition of donations from abroad. 
d.  This is to reduce foreign intervention in the 
policy-making process after the elections.
e. Limitation of the use of campaign funds. 
f.  It is to limit the dependency of candidates or 
political parties on the donors. In addition, 
it is also to create a balanced political 
contestation among the candidates
g. Limitation of campaign time. 
h.  It is intended to reduce the circulation of 
money during the campaign period. The 
longer the period of the campaign, the 
greater the need for the flow of money
i. Public transparency. 
j.  Candidates shall explain the income and 
expenditure to the public transparently. 
Thus, the public know information about the 
campaign funds. In addition, the media and 
civil society can control the candidate from 
the influence of the donors, and, the flow of 
dirty money in the circulation of campaign 
funds can be reduced.
k. Strengthening fund resources from the 
public. 
l. It is intended to reduce the dependence of 
candidates on the individual donor or group.
21  Ibid. 
22  Ibid, p. 486.
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Second, related to the control of social access 
by the incumbent, the most important thing to 
note is ‘charismatic’ politics of the incumbent 
who uses state facilities attached to the post. 
It is at this point, the space non-conventional 
corruption is open wide. It is true that non-
conventional corruption is not a crime because 
it is not criminalized in the law of corruption. 
However, non-conventional corruption is very 
close to conventional corruption. Those who 
like committing non-conventional corruption 
will easily perform conventional corruption if 
there is an opportunity to do so.23  Voters should 
be aware that non-conventional corruption is a 
behavior that must be avoided. It is necessary 
to make people understand in order not to 
vote for a candidate who likes committing 
non-conventional corruption, as someday he 
might act corruptly in the conventional sense. 
Therefore, the space should be open wide for 
the people to demand the incumbent, as well 
as other candidates, to show commitment, 
consistency attitude, and integrity in the fight 
against political corruption.
Third, to narrow the political corruption by 
incumbent who dominates political access, Law 
No. 8 of 2015 has accommodated the preventive 
measures to narrow the space violation of 
the incumbent. Some considerations related 
to the preventive measures proposed by the 
Government during the discussion of the Law 
23  Moh. Mahfud MD, Pemberantasan Mafia 
Peradilan:Mendiagnosa Akar Masalah, 
Menemukan Solusi Terarah, Keynote Speech pada 
Debat Publik dalam Rangka 10 Tahun Komisi 
Hukum Nasional (KHN), held by Komisi Hukum 
Nasional (KHN), Thursday, Februari 18, 2010 at 
Hotel Millenium, Jakarta.
No. 8 of 2015 in the House of Representatives, 
among others are:24 
1. The political dynasty is set in such a 
way because the incumbent has access to 
policies and access to budget allocation, so 
it could give personal advantage to win the 
regional head election or to win his groups. 
In reality, most practices commonly done 
by the incumbent are to enlarge the grant, 
social aid fund, program activities directed 
to an attempt to win one candidate.
2. Naturally, the incumbent has a wide range 
of facilities and benefits attached to him, 
so, in carrying out his duties and functions, 
the facilities and benefits will attach to him 
constantly. For example, in many cases 
it can often be seen that there are many 
banners showing programs and activities, 
in which there is a picture of the incumbent 
or incumbent name associated with the 
election at the time.
3. Because he is still in office, the incumbent 
has the advantage of the programs and the 
activities which entirely or partially can be 
directed to win him or to win his dynasty.
4. In connection with the neutrality the civil 
servants, the incumbent has greater access 
to mobilize civil servants in order to 
provide favorable support to him.
Based on such things, in Law No. 8 of 2015 
contains a provision that forbid the incumbent to 
transfer employees 6 months before the expiry 
of the term of office. In addition, the elected 
24  Keterangan Presiden dalam persidangan tanggal 
22 April 2015. See Putusan MK Nomor 33/PUU-
XIII/2015, p. 74-76.
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regional head is prohibited to transfer the civil 
servants within a period of 6 (six) months after 
the inauguration. The provision is intended 
to guarantee the neutrality of bureaucracy. 
The provision is based also on the fact that in 
relationships in society, the position between 
incumbent’s families and other candidates is not 
in an equal condition.25 If the rule is clear, then 
it requires the strict law enforcement. In this 
case, the rule of law is not only characterized 
by the availability of legal rules, but it should 
be accompanied by the ability to enforce the 
rule of law.
Referring to the above description, the 
key actors in the prevention of political 
corruption are concentrated on the two parties: 
the incumbent candidates and the voters. It 
reminds the interesting discourse written by 
Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter. 
According to both of them, an important key 
for a successful transition period to a true 
democracy lies in two parties: (1) the political 
elite and (2) civil society, including voters.26 
Political elites (leaders) are needed to run 
democracy well. When the political elites 
commit corrupt political practices, the public’s 
distrust will increase, and therefore, the quality 
of democracy will be degraded. Similarly, it 
also needs the civil society who is capable of 
acting autonomously, independently, and able 
to be organized for concerted action.
25  Ibid.
26  See Guillermo O’Donnel & Philippe Schmitter, 
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Tentative 
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1986), p.19, 48.
Associated with the political elites in the 
context of the regional election, the candidate 
for regional head is required, through particular 
mechanism and governed by strict regulations, 
to have a clear commitment for the realization 
of a democratic society and a commitment not 
to perform corrupt ways in the election. At the 
same time, the voters, as part of civil society, 
have to be smart, independent and rational in 
voting, as well as active in monitoring. Thus 
the election can produce quality leader who is 
not oriented in pragmatic power.
The quality of the election is determined 
by the voters and the existence of the system 
covering the political corruption space. The 
more the number of rational and critical voters, 
the better the quality of the regional head 
chosen.  The rational and critical voters are 
those who rationally have political awareness 
and can critically examine the prospective 
regional head, ranging from his program, 
vision and mission, track record, experience, 
and capacity of leadership, so they can think 
rationally before choosing. The election should 
also be supported by a regulatory system that 
closes the chances of political corruption. 
CONCLUSION
Efforts to prevent political corruption in 
the regional elections should consider the 
following matters:
1. In connection with the control of access to 
economy by the incumbent, if the political 
funds is seen as the epicenter of political 
corruption, the regulatory regime of 
political corruption should be emphasized 
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on the efforts to control the flow of 
money in political campaigns. Related 
to the campaign funds in the regional 
elections, Bima Arya Sugiarto mentioned 
two important factors: (1) the source of 
funding, and (2) the financial statements. 
In practice, the main sources of candidates’ 
campaigns come from the candidate 
himself. Therefore, financial preparation 
is a necessary condition for the set to be 
a candidate. In addition to obligation to 
submit the Wealth Report, the candidate 
can also be requested the financial profile 
which states factual financial readiness.
2. Voters should be aware that non-
conventional corruption is a behavior that 
must be avoided. It is necessary to make 
people understand in order not to vote for 
a candidate who likes committing non-
conventional corruption, as someday he 
might act corruptly in the conventional 
sense. Therefore, the space should be 
open wide for the people to demand the 
incumbent, as well as other candidates, to 
show commitment, consistency attitude, 
and integrity in the fight against political 
corruption
3. Law No. 8 of 2015 has accommodated the 
preventive measures to narrow the space 
violation of the incumbent. If the law is 
clear, then it requires strict law enforcement 
or no compromise. In this case, the rule 
of law is not only characterized by the 
availability of legal rules, but it must be 
accompanied by the ability to enforce the 
rule of law.
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